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administration. While Antosh does not come to the limits (if any) of
Carroll, it can be said to be a timely decision. If there is a movement
toward equality with the private labor sector by the public employee,36
Antosh must be considered a significant step.
Jon J. Vichich
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-Confine-
ment under conditions shocking to the conscience of reasonably civi-
lized people-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that habeas
corpus is available to seek relief from a confinement under conditions
which amount to cruel and unusual punishment, even though the de-
tention itself is legal.
Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110
(1971).
Bryant was confined in Holmesburg State Prison on an indictment
charging him with burglary, larceny, and receiving stolen goods. He
was also subject to a military detainer. On a writ of habeas corpus, he
complained that the general conditions of his confinement constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his eighth amendment
right.' The evidence indicated dirty and overcrowded cells which were
infested with cockroaches and rats. Specifically, he alleged that he was
in constant fear for his personal safety. Prisoners charged with serious
crimes were confined with prisoners charged with lesser offenses. The
prison ran on an open cell system whereby cells were left open during
the day, allowing prisoners to walk freely from cell to cell. There was
an insufficient number of guards in proportion to the prison popula-
tion, and the guards were inadequately trained. The unsafe conditions
were manifested by incidents of sexual assaults, possession of weapons,
narcotics traffic, and theft. The medical staff was inadequate. And
finally, the guards launched an oppressive campaign of violence after
a prison riot. The court found the conditions "disgusting and degrad-
36. See Oberer, The Future of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 20 LAB.
L.J. 777, 778 (1969).
1. U. S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
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ing,'' 2 and held that since these conditions taken as a whole fell short
of satisfying the "idealistic concepts of dignity, morality, and decency,'
Bryant was denied his fundamental right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. As a result, the court granted the writ, and
ordered Bryant released to the Marine Corps, which held a detainer
on him for absence without leave.
The Supreme Court of the United States long ago recognized that
"difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent
of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual
punishment shall not be inflicted. ' 4 But even in the absence of a clear
definition, it was established that punishments of torture and all other
punishments of unnecessary cruelty were forbidden. Such punishments
included those which were "manifestly cruel and unusual, as burning
at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel or the like,"5 and
those which were cruel, such as ones that involve torture or a lingering
death.8 It was also advanced that the amendment's prohibition was
directed against punishments "which by their excessive length or sever-
ity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." 7 Conduct
within the scope of the eighth amendment's prohibitions is that which
falls below the traditional humanity of modem Anglo-American law or
produces unnecessary pain or wantonly inflicts pain.8 Probably the
most inclusive approach was that the amendment includes nothing less
than the "dignity of man"9 and assures that a state's punishment power
"be exercised within the limits of civilized standards."' 0 The amend-
ment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 1
The Bryant decision in applying these standards added another di-
mension to the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment. For the
first time in Pennsylvania, the eighth amendment was applied to the
general, cumulative conditions of detention. It is significant that at no
time did Bryant testify that he personally was beaten or abused. His
allegations were centered around his fear for his personal safety. In
2. 444 Pa. 83, 94, 280 A-.d 110, 115 (1971).
3. Id. at 98, 280 A.2d at 117.
4. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878): See generally Granucci, Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
5. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1889).
6. Id. at 447.
7. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1891) (dissenting opinion).
8. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1946).
9. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 101.
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the past, the courts had only concerned themselves with isolated prac-
tices in which prisoners had experienced personal abuse.12 In fact, the
state argued that the writ should not lie for just that reason, and added
that the testimony concerning the general living conditions was irrele-
vant. To this the lower court responded that "to contend that evidence
of these conditions is 'irrelevant' is like contending that if an untried
prisoner were committed pending trial to a leper colony he would be
unable to secure a writ of habeas corpus unless he proved that he
contracted leprosy.'1 3
Non-intentional treatment can constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The prison officials had no effective control over the age of the
cells or their overcrowding; they did not intend that prisoners should
abuse other prisoners. The officials did not intend the conditions any
more than a jury in finding a man guilty of a crime intends any addi-
tional punishment beyond the length of the sentence imposed by law.
Prior to this decision, the acts complained of were always intended as
a means of discipline. 14
Finally, in Negrich v. Hohn, 5 it was held that to be cruel and un-
usual punishment within constitutional prohibition, it was first neces-
sary that the hardship suffered be punishment. That court affirmed the
notion that punishment was a penalty inflicted by a judicial tribunal
in accordance with law in retribution for criminal conduct. Obviously,
Bryant departs from that position since there could have been no pun-
ishment in the constitutional sense as the petitioner was in pre-trial
confinement in lieu of $3,500 bail.
Bryant relied upon the leading case of Holt v. Sarver16 in finding
the conditions of prison life at the particular institution unconstitu-
tional, but went beyond that case in light of the remedy permitted.
In Holt, a class action which alleged unconstitutional living conditions
was brought under sections 1343(3)'1 and 198318 of the Civil Rights Act.
12. See Wiltsie v. California Dep't of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1968) (beating
with fists and clubs); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), modifying 268 F.
Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (whipping with strap); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d
Cir. 1967) (solitary confinement without blankets, clothes, or sanitary facilities); Talley v.
Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (whipping with strap).
13. 444 Pa. 83, 98, 280 A.2d 110, 117 (1971).
14. Cases cited note 12 supra.
15. 246 F. Supp. 173, 176 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
16. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
17. Civil Rights Act of 1957, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as
Civil Rights Act].
18. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) [hereinafter also referred to as Civil
Rights Act]. Under the Civil Rights Act, a prisoner can sue for civil damages or obtain
injunctive relief in federal courts. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies where the alleged injury is
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There the court granted a declaratory judgment that the entire penal
system at the institution was unconstitutional, and issued an injunction
in favor of the entire inmate population.'9 The Holt decision, as Bryant,
favored the total impact of prison life as opposed to the traditional
examination of specific instances of mistreatment. Both courts recog-
nized that curing the cumulative conditions of prison life was more
realistic and effective than to prevent isolated instances which, after
having been found unlawful, could be replaced by a more sophisticated
version of the same punishment.
Whereas Holt fashioned relief through injunction, Bryant effected
relief by granting a writ of habeas corpus which would cause either
transfer or discharge of prisoners from confinement. Traditionally, the
writ functioned only to test the legality of a prisoner's commitment
and detention,20 and to challenge the jurisdiction of the convicting
court.21 The writ was never a substitute for an appeal,22 because habeas
would not lie to test the ordinary procedural errors at trial; only if
such errors were enough to cause the entire detention to become un-
lawful was the writ available as a remedy.2 Normally, this meant that
there was some constitutional infirmity in the proceeding such as a
conviction based upon a coerced confession.24 But the guilt or inno-
cence of the petitioner was never in issue as the collateral challenge
only tested the legality of detention. However, the Bryant court re-
jected the writ's traditional use as it conceded that the writ would
issue even though the detention was legal if the general conditions in-
fringed a constitutional right.
caused by a person acting under color of any law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983(3) applies to conspiracies
to deprive rights. Cases often arise under the Civil Rights Act involving unjustified vio-
lence amounting to a denial of due process. Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961)
(religious freedom); Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957) (guard mistreat-
ment); Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1953).
19. 309 F. Supp. 362, 382-85 (E.D. Ark, 1970).
20. 444 Pa. at 87, 280 A.2d at 112. There are other limits to the use of habeas corpus
such as exhaustion of remedies. Johnson v. Dye, 338 U.S. 864 (1969) (per curiam). See
Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952) (issuance of writ could only effect im-
mediate release from custody); Commonwealth ex rel. Milewski v. Ashe, 362 Pa. 48, 66
A.2d 281 (1949); Commonwealth ex rel. Wright v. Banmiller, 195 Pa. Super. 124, 168
A.2d 925 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 928 (1962) (the writ was unavailable to review
the mode of confinement or internal prison administration); Note, Prisoners' Remedies for
Mistreatment, 59 YALE L.J. 800 (1950).
21. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Passinore Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9, 18
(1855).
22. Commonwealth ex rel. Ryan v. Rundle, 411 Pa. 613, 192 A.2d 362 (1963).
23. Commonwealth ex rel. Roseborough v. Myers, 202 Pa. Super. 31, 195 A.2d 152
(1963).
24. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Commonwealth ex rel. McKenna v. Cavell, 423
Pa. 387, 224 A.2d 616 (1966).
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Bryant also reflects a departure from the customary judicial unwill-
ingness to investigate or review internal prison management and dis-
cipline not directly related to the sentence imposed. 25 Such intervention,
it was thought, would tend to erode the authority that prison officials
had established: courts generally adopted a "hands off" policy.26 But
this attitude began to dissipate with the leading case of Coffin v.
Reichard.2 7 The Bryant court, although refusing to assume a super-
visory role in prison administration, held that Pennsylvania courts
would intervene to protect fundamental rights. The courts will not
entertain petitions that could easily be remedied by an appeal to in-
ternal prison authorities or to an administrative agency, but, neverthe-
less, Bryant represents the latest, and by far the most drastic, judicial
intervention into internal prison life.
The essence of the decision was the recognition that habeas corpus
can be utilized to secure relief from any restraint which violates funda-
mental law.28 As the court noted, "there was respectable common law
authority for the proposition that habeas was available to remedy any
kind of governmental restraint contrary to fundamental law."29 The
court emphasized that the scope of habeas has grown "to achieve its
grand purpose-the protection of individuals against erosion of the
right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty."' 0 In at-
tempting to dramatize the meaning of "any restraint," the court cited
In re Jones,31 which held that actual detention in prison was not an
indispensable condition precedent to the issuance of habeas corpus, and
that a person on parole was also entitled to a writ since there was still
a presence of restraint. The court also added that "unlike possible
alternate remedies.... [sic] mandamus, injunction and so forth, habeas
relief can be initiated by an unsophisticated petitioner .... "32 In sum-
mary, the Bryant decision affirms the proposition that a prisoner of the
state does not lose all his civil rights during and because of his incarcera-
25. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954);
Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Banmiller, 190 Pa. Super. 474, 154 A.2d 330 (1959).
26. Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 506-09 (1963). The traditional view began to
dissipate once the eighth amendment was applied to the states in Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
27. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
28. 444 Pa. 83, 88-89, 280 A.2d 110, 113-14 (1971). The court was citing Peyton v. Rowe,
391 U.S. 54 (1968), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
29. 444 Pa. at 88, 280 A.2d at 112.
30. Id. at 89, 280 A.2d at 113.
31. Id. at 98, 280 A.2d at 117. See In re Jones, 57 Cal. 2d 860, 372 P.2d 310, 22
Cal. Rptr. 478 (1962).
32. Id. at 92, 280 A.2d at 114.
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tion.3 3 In particular, he continues to be protected by the due process 4
and equal protection35 clauses which follow him through the prison
doors.38
Perhaps the narrower solution would have been to restrict review
of general prison conditions through the Civil Rights Act. Under the
Civil Rights Act, an award of damages or the issuance of an injunction
does not depend upon a showing of physical injury but upon whether
the defendant's conduct fell within the scope of the action the statute
was intended to penalize. A successful class action under the Civil
Rights Act would, as in Holt, precipitate an injunction. Under Sec-
tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, release from penal custody is dis-
allowed.37 Even though the Holt court determined that a class action
was the proper means to secure relief, Bryant recognized that private,
individual relief could also be sought. The main difficulty with granting
individual relief is that the courts will necessarily be flooded with
habeas petitions. It seems that all that any subsequent petitioner would
have to prove is that he is an inmate in the same prison. However,
the court to a certain extent precluded such a result, for it noted that
it would not entertain any further petitions for 30 days so as to allow
the authorities time to remedy the conditions that led to the issuance
of the writ.38 But even though the court modified the use of the deci-
sion, the court effectively issued an ultimatum to the legislature that
the judiciary would not be afraid to utilize its powers if meaningful
prison reform was not immediately implemented.
Another possible solution, as the court noted, was a writ of man-
damus to the prison officials to perform their duty to protect prisoners.
The court was preoccupied with the danger that however cooperative
and inoffensive a convict might be, he has "no assurance whatever
that he will not be killed, seriously injured or sexually abused. Under
the present system, the State cannot protect him."39 Also, the court
noted that the conditions at the prison deprived the petitioner of the
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, a right to which
33. Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d
443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
34. See Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785 (5th
Cir. 1953); Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J. 1949).
35. See Dowd v. United States ex tel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1950); Cochran v. Kansas,
316 U.S. 255 (1942).
36. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
37. Peinado v. Adult Authority of Dep't of Corrections, 405 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 US. 968 (1969).
38. 444 Pa. 83, 87, 280 A.2d 110, 112 (1971).
39. Id. at 96, A.2d at 117.
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he was entitled. There was a strong suggestion that the state and prison
officials were not fulfilling a duty to protect prisoners from abuse. The
duty approach, although not generally adopted as a method of relief,
was first posited in Coffin v. Reichard40 and in Logan v. United States.41
The writ of mandamus would be the proper method to enforce the
duty of the prison authorities, but, in reality, it would be ineffective.
In this case, the most effective target of the mandamus is the legisla-
ture, but it is questionable whether the judiciary could force the legis-
lature to appropriate funds to build modem prisons or to hire more
guards and assure that they are properly trained.
The impact of the decision could be sweeping. It is conceivable that
a writ would issue to criminal defendants adjudged incompetent to
stand trial and be placed in mental institutions under the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966.42 State mental
institutions are often criticized for their alleged lack of facilities and
proper care.4A There is no question that commitment to a mental in-
stitution for the criminally insane is a form of governmental restraint
on personal liberty. And it is not unlikely that the same general condi-
tions that existed at Holmesburg Prison could exist at a state mental
hospital.
If such an action were initiated, the state would probably argue that
Bryant should be restricted to penal restraints; that is, application
should be restricted to convicted criminals and defendants in pre-trial
detention. In Commonwealth v. Bruno,44 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that "punitive confinement in prison is not the same as
custodial supervision in a hospital."'45 But because Bryant refers to any
governmental restraint as the basis for habeas relief, the distinction
between punitive confinement and custodial supervision should be
minimal.
But even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the distinc-
tion, there is a strong argument that custodial supervision in such an
institution is tantamount to a prison sentence. Under the Mental
Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966,46 a criminally insane de-
40. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
41. 144 U.S. 263 (1892); see also Johnson v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Va.
1966); Cohen v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4408 (1969).
43. 110 U. PA. L. REV. 78 (1961).
44. 435 Pa. 200, 255 A.2d 519 (1969).
45. Id. at 204, 255 A.2d at 521.
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4408 (1969).
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fendant can receive outpatient care under conditions imposed by the
court, including the posting of bond. In addition, if the defendant
regains sanity and, after conviction at trial, is sentenced to prison, the
time spent in the mental "hospital" is considered custody, and such
time will be credited toward the sentence received from the crime
charged.4 7 Finally, when a mental competency hearing is ordered by
the court, the defendant is granted the right to be represented by
counsel. 48
Civil detention would also be subject to review. As it is imposed by
judicial authority, it too is a form of governmental restraint. The
Bryant decision by implication makes no distinction between criminal
and civil detention since the holding prohibits any governmental re-
straint contrary to fundamental law. There is a current controversy in
Pennsylvania with respect to the enactment of a right to treatment law
for persons civilly committed. Such a law would require proper medical
and psychiatric care. The fact that such legislation is under considera-
tion forces the conclusion that, generally, existing treatment is in-
adequate. The Bryant mandate could be applied therefore to civil
commitment, and possibly accelerate the passage of such legislation.
The Bryant decision leaves one important question unanswered. It
fails to specify which, if any, specific instances of mistreatment would
satisfy habeas relief. Its holding is restricted to the impact of cumulative
conditions that taken as a whole fall short of the standards of human
dignity and decency which the eighth amendment requires.
William C. Woodward, Jr.
47. Commonwealth v. Jones, 211 Pa. Super. 366, 236 A.2d 834 (1967).
48. Commonwealth ex rel. McGurrin v. Shovlin, 435 Pa. 474, 257 A.2d 902 (1969).
